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recognized as jurisdictional defenses under the constitutive documents of the various interna-
tional criminal tribunals and other international fora where claims of human rights abuses 
and charges of international criminal conduct can now be heard and decided. In this sense, 
there is no tension between immunities and accountability. 
There is always pressure for change. One current pressure point concerns the effort to 
make states amenable to civil suit in foreign courts for torts committed against foreign 
nationals in their own territory or in an extraterritorial context. The first kind of suit might 
involve, for example, claims of mistreatment and abuse committed by domestic authorities 
against foreign nationals who return to their own countries to file claims for civil damages. 
In the context of U.S. law, one could think of Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,7 as well as suits 
brought under the expropriation or terrorism exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act. 8 The second situation might arise where states are said to have human rights obligations, 
and therefore to be amenable to suit at home, in foreign courts, or in an international forum, 
for actions taken outside their territory. In my view, these are very problematic propositions, 
especially given that alternative mechanisms (for example, in bilateral channels or regional 
and international forums) frequently exist for resolving such issues. 
Eli Lauerpacht famously wrote in 1954 that' 'exemption from legal process is not congenial 
to the climate of the modem State.' ,9 While his appreciation of the balance between immunity 
and accountability, like that of Wilfred Jenks, seems to remain valid today, it is important 
not to lose sight of the functions and purposes served by immunities appropriately applied. 
IMMUNITY FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS: 
POSSIBLY Too MUCH AND CONFUSING AS WELL 
by Barry E. Carter' 
In his thoughtful presentation, David Stewart observes from his daily experience that the 
law of international immunities is a "rather complex body of rules." In analyzing immunity 
issues, one needs to take into account treaties, laws, and/or cases that include, among others, 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, diplomatic and consular immunity, the case law 
regarding head of state immunity, and international organization law. In addition, there is 
pending the new UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property. 
Mr. Stewart also posits a general conclusion that in recent decades the general trend has 
been to limit the scope of immunities granted to individuals. Although this might be true in 
many respects, it would seem that immunity for foreign government officials, other than 
diplomats, has expanded rather than contracted in recent years. The relevant law has also 
become more complex. I question whether this expansion and increased complexity are good 
developments, or instead ones that discourage appropriate accountability for these individuals. 
It might be useful to start with two broad propositions. 
First, the United States and some other countries have expanded considerably the prescrip-
tive jurisdictional reach of their laws in the past fifteen to twenty years. 
7 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993). 
828 U.S.c. §§ 1605(a)(3) and (7). 
9 E. Lauterpacht, The Codification of the Law of Diplomatic Immunity, 40 TRANSAcnONS OF THE GRonus Soc'Y 
FOR 1954, at 71. 
• Professor of Law and Director of Program in International Business and Economic Law, Georgetown University. 
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For the United States, an important reaction to terrorist attacks and threats has been to 
enact and implement laws that create criminal and civil liability for attacks or other acts 
against U.S. citizens wherever they might be at the time of the event. In terms of international 
principles of jurisdiction, the United States has switched from its usual opposition to the 
passive personality principle that lasted through at least the 1970s to a position that embraces 
the principle in many situations. The principle provides that a state may apply its law "to 
an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the victim of the 
act was its national." 1 
As an illustration, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 provides that any U.S. national injured by reason of 
an act of international terrorism may sue in a U.S. district court for treble damages and the 
costs of the suit. The law does not require that the act occur in the United States or that it 
have any effect here; rather, it requires only that a U.S. national is injured.2 
In the immunity area, a prime example is the (a)(7) exception to the Foreign Sovereig~ 
Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.c. § 1605(a)(7). This exception allows U.S. nationals to sue 
foreign states, designated as supporting terrorism, for money damages for personal injury or 
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking, or providing material support to those who committed those acts. The claimant is 
not required to sue first in the foreign state's court, but only needs to afford "the foreign 
state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted rules of 
international arbitration" when the act occurred within the foreign state's territory. When 
the act occurred in a third state (e.g., Iranian-supported terrorism in Israel), the arbitration 
provision is inapplicable and the only forum provided for in the (a)(7) exception is the U.S. 
federal courts. 
Second, while U.S. jurisdictional reach has been expanding geographically, immunity 
doctrines for foreign government officials have been heading in the opposite direction. It is 
now easier for foreign government officials to claim immunity, and the application and 
interpretation of the U.S. laws regarding them has become more confusing. 
The primary reason for this is that the FSIA is more and more being interpreted to cover 
foreign officials acting within the scope of their official authority. This is so despite the fact 
that the law, as enacted in 1976, does not on its face appear to include natural persons. The 
law deals with suits against "foreign states," which the statute defines to include political 
subdivisions or an "agency or instrumentality." An agency or instrumentality is defined as 
"any entity... which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise. . .. ,,3 
However, because some courts were concerned that plaintiffs might avoid the FSIA limita-
tions by suing individual foreign officials rather than the states, and because of concerns 
about foreign policy implications, U.S. courts have increasingly held that the FSIA extends 
to suits against a foreign official operating within his or her official capacity. This was 
illustrated recently in Velasco v. Government of Indonesia,4 where the court held that the 
1 RESTATEMENT THIRD, RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §402, cmt. g. (1987). 
2 See also, e.g., the Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (reprinted at 28 U.S.C. § 
1350 note) and 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (amended in 1984 to include the possession of automobiles abroad that had been 
stolen in the United States). 
328 U.S.c. § 1603(b) (emphasis added). 
4 Velasco v. Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392 (4th CiT. 2004). 
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FSIA covered the acts within their official capacities of Indonesia's former ambassador to 
Syria and a former deputy of Indonesia's National Defense Security Council.5 
It is time to ask whether this trend may have gone too far. For example, assume the Saudi 
equivalent of the U.S. deputy secretary of the treasury directs that large sums of Saudi 
government money and some of his own funds should be paid to a large charity that provides 
substantial support to a terrorist organization that conducts an attack against a U.S. airport 
or against a U.S. citizen in a third country. That second-level Saudi official would probably 
be immune from suit for his official acts under the FSIA today.6 In contrast, he might well 
not have been immune from a suit fifteen to twenty years ago when the FSIA was not 
ordinarily interpreted to cover foreign officials, assuming that personal jurisdiction could be 
obtained somehow. 
Is this greater immunity good policy? Foreign government officials, like the Saudi one 
above, should not necessarily be immune for activities that might be within the scope of 
their responsibility, but are activities that are decidedly ones that the United States and other 
countries do not condone--e.g., supporting terrorism, torturing prisoners, and expropriating 
property. 
Even if one supports some immunity for foreign officials, is the present dividing line 
between acts within and outside the scope of their authority a clear and satisfactory one? 
For example, in Velasco, after the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed that the Indonesian officials 
were covered under the FSIA for acts taken in their official capacities, the court concluded 
that the alleged acts were outside the scope of their official capacities, but dismissed the 
lawsuit because the plaintiffs had failed to sue the particular defendants in their individual 
capacities.7 
In any case, it is unfortunate that the scope of immunity today for government officials 
is also subject to overlapping and possibly conflicting rules. For example, even as the FSIA 
is now being read to include individual officials, the common law doctrine of head-of-state 
immunity continues to exist. In the United States today, head-of-state immunity would seem 
to be available to a foreign state's head, foreign minister, and possibly their families and maybe 
other high-ranking officials. U.S. courts generally follow an Executive Branch suggestion of 
immunity, but questions often arise when the Executive Branch is silent.8 In part because 
of its basis in case law, the doctrine is unclear regarding exactly who might be covered, the 
role of the Executive Branch, and the doctrine's relationship to the FSIA. 
This uncertainty is compounded by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent support for statements 
of interest from the Executive Branch. The Court specifically noted last summer in Alvarez-
Machain v. Sosa9 that in some cases, "there is a strong argument that federal courts should 
give serious weight to the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy." 
5 See also, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September II, 2001, 349 F.Supp. 2d 765,788 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding 
that the FSIA covered the official acts of the Prince Sultan, the third-highest ranking member of the Saudi Arabian 
government, and Prince Turki, the Saudi ambassador to England, who had been the director of Saudi Arabia's 
Department of General Intelligence). Note that the author provided legal advice on some issues to plaintiffs' lawyers 
in one of these consolidated cases. For earlier FSIA cases, see, e.g., Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 976 
F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1992), and Jungquist v. Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
6 There are exceptions to immunity under the FSIA, but they are carefully circumscribed and probably would 
not be applicable to this hypothetical. One possible approach for the study and possible changes mentioned below 
would be to amend certain exceptions under the FSIA, such as the (a)(5) exceptions for torts. It is now limited in 
part to suits seeking damages for death or injury "occurring in the United States." 28 U.S.c. §1605(A)(5). 
7 370 F.3d at 402. 
8 See generally, Barry E. Carter, et aI., International Law 611-618 (4th ed., 2003). 
9 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21 (2004). 
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While this willingness of the court to listen to the State Department's views has considerable 
merit, the somewhat haphazard process for issuing these statements of interest means that 
results in individual cases are uncertain. 
As a closing example of how far changes have come in the past 20 years or so in the 
immunity area-i.e., more immunity and more confusion---consider the seminal Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS) case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. lO The defendant, Pena, was the inspector 
general of police in Asuncion, Paraguay, when he allegedly kidnapped and tortured Filartiga 
in Paraguay in 1976. In the successful ATS suit brought by Filartiga's family against Pena, 
the Second Circuit did not discuss whether Pena, a government official at the time of the 
torture, was protected under the then-new FSIA. 
Former police official Pena might be immune under the FSIA today, though there would 
be a question of whether the torturing and death were within the scope of his authority and 
whether the FSIA applies to former government officials. However, if the FSIA applies, 
then the holding in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess ll makes it clear that the FSIA 
would be the "sole basis" for obtaining jurisdiction over Pena, not the ATSY 
Given this complexity and lack of clarity, it might be useful to recall the immunity situation 
in the 1970s for foreign states. After the Tate letter of 1952, the U.S. State Department had 
been making decisions on immunity for foreign states, which the U.S. courts accepted. For 
various reasons, the practice was inconsistent, and the State Department was uncomfortable 
with its role. So, in 1976, with the State Department's encouragement, Congress passed the 
FSIA, which was designed to provide objective standards to be interpreted by the courts on 
whether or not a foreign state should be granted immunity. 
Now, thirty years later, questions arise about the scope of the FSIA regarding the immunity 
of foreign officials, and there is continuing uncertainty about the head-of-state doctrine. It 
would seem timely for the academic community, the Executive Branch, and Congress to 
analyze these questions further. 
First, what should be the appropriate standards for immunity for foreign officials? Part of 
this analysis should include careful research into the laws and practices of other countries-
research that has not been done. For consideration of reciprocity and diplomacy, it would 
seem wise to know what other countries are doing as the United States moves forward. 
Second, on the basis of the analysis recommended above, there should be an effort to 
develop a reasonably clear set of statutory standards regarding immunity for foreign officials 
who are not diplomats, standards that could amend or supplement the FSIA and might well 
override the common law head-of-state doctrine. 
ARBITRATING HUMAN RIGHTS 
by Roger P. Alford' 
Corporate liability is the current rage in human rights litigation. According to the Institute 
for Legal Reform, affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, over forty cases are 
currently pending against corporations for alleged violations of the Alien Tort Statute or the 
10 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
II 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
12 The U.S. Supreme Court cited Filitariga with apparent approval in Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2764, but that was 
regarding the scope of the law of nations, not the scope of foreign officials' immunity . 
• Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
